Press Statement
Sean McCormack, Spokesman
Washington, DC
January 5, 2007



The United States Condemns Ongoing Violence in Darfur



The United States condemns the ongoing violence in Darfur that prevents a durable cease-fire, including the bombing by Sudanese Armed Forces of areas around Um Rai in North Darfur in late December and early January.

A joint African Union - United Nations team, led by African Union Force Commander Aprezi, had just met with Darfur rebel commanders in Um Rai on December 28 in order to urge them to abide by the ceasefire and participate fully in the Ceasefire Commission. Immediately after the meeting, the Sudanese Armed Forces bombed the meeting site.


These actions violate the Sudanese government's pledge made in Addis Ababa on November 16, 2006 to facilitate the work of the African Union to achieve a strengthened ceasefire.


In addition, the United States is deeply concerned with violence around Gereida, South Darfur, where rebel militias have attacked humanitarian workers.


The United States calls on all parties to the Darfur conflict to refrain from violence, renew their commitment to the ceasefire, and fully participate in the Ceasefire Commission, in particular its next meeting scheduled for Monday, January 8.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/78423.htm

TRANSCRIPT:

1:43 p.m. EST

MR. MCCORMACK: Okay, you've already had your announcement for the day, so we'll just get -- that's it. Those are the only announcements.


QUESTION: Can you confirm it, though? (Laughter.)


MR. MCCORMACK: I feel on solid footing, James, in confirming this one.


QUESTION: What's your reaction to it?


MR. MCCORMACK: My reaction? I welcome it.


QUESTION: Can you address the recent Sudanese statements and can you give us any greater
-- you suggested this morning that they have expressed a willingness to talk about the phase one and the phase two deployments.


MR. MCCORMACK: Right, right.


QUESTION: I've searched our stories. Maybe they missed it, but I don't see anything that explicit in any of their comments. Have they told you that privately or --


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I think within the past couple weeks -- it was maybe the week before last, the week between Christmas and New Year's -- there was a letter from President Bashir to representatives of the United Nations saying that they would -- they were ready to move forward or suggesting they were ready to move forward on phase one and two, left three unanswered.


And the indications that we have had thus far is that they are ready to move forward on phase one and two. As I tried to point out this morning, there is another half to this, and that is the UN being ready to actually deploy and get its preparations ready. And they have had representatives from that first phase on the ground in Sudan and even had some of them go out to Al Fasher. They subsequently returned back to Khartoum because I think there were some questions about what sort of facilities -- whether the facilities that they would occupy were ready. I don't think that that was one that we could put on the Sudanese Government. And so they are working to make sure that there are appropriate facilities for them to work out of. That's the first phase. It's on the order of 70 people thereabouts, but get the full numbers from the UN.


Then the second phase is about -- roughly about a thousand, a thousand people, which is essentially a headquarters element. And to my knowledge -- and you can check with the UN -- they haven't yet contacted the Sudanese Government about deploying that component to Sudan. So, in essence, we haven't tested that proposition yet fully, or the UN hasn't fully tested that proposition. Sudan has said that they are willing to work with them and get them in there so we don't -- we can't come to at least an early conclusion on the phase two. On phase one, I think they're working through it. Obviously, phase three remains, and that's the bulk of the force. That's thousands and thousands of AU UN forces in Sudan which is what you really need. That's where you need to get to. All of this is preliminary work.


So the Sudanese thus far have demonstrated at least on phase one the cooperation. I don't think the international system has yet tested them on phase two yet. I don't think it's fair to say that we have tested them on phase two. And Andrew Natsios also talked to them about some other items on his list, and I think the reaction on that was sort of mixed. So the bottom line is the process is moving forward slowly, in incremental chunks, and certainly we wish that it would go forward faster. But it isn't. But the way you keep it moving forward and the way you have a hope of increasing that pace of those deployments, at least from the Sudanese side, is to keep up the diplomatic pressure. And that's one reason why Andrew Natsios is in China now talking to the Chinese because the Chinese, I think everybody understands, have -- they have some leverage with the Sudanese because of their commercial relationships.


QUESTION: Why are you not talking about Plan B, the unspecified consequences that Special Envoy Natsios said the Sudanese would suffer if they didn't agree to the hybrid force in its entirety in writing, including phase three, by the end of the year. I mean, it's like you're talking about pressure but you're not mentioning the one thing that you guys were talking about as pressure.


MR. MCCORMACK: Of course we're thinking through those. Of course we're thinking through that. And part of what you do in diplomacy, you always have your Plan B. And if we come to the judgment that the diplomatic track that we are on right now, the tactics that we're employing at the moment, aren't producing the results that we want to see at an acceptable rate, then you move to Plan B. But you have already done -- once you get to that point, if you're doing your planning well you have already gotten to Plan B, you have already thought through what Plan B is and laid the groundwork for it. So, yeah, we are thinking about what happens if this current set of diplomatic tactics doesn't work, but we're not prepared at this point to talk about them.


QUESTION: Doesn't it undermine your credibility with the Sudanese when you make what was effectively a threat -- do this by the end of the year or else -- and then you don't yet carry through because they didn't it in full by the end of the year?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, again, this is -- we would have liked to have seen the whole force deployed some time ago. Let's pause at that. We would have loved to have -- liked very much to have seen this deployed some time ago, but that's not where we were. The Sudanese did make some steps in the direction of the international community not certainly steps that are sufficient to meet all the conditions laid out by the international community or the goals laid out by the international community. And I don't want to be in a position of trying to explain that away for the Sudanese Government because I'm certainly not. But what I'm trying to deal with is the reality of this process. The reality of this process is that it has moved slowly. But the only reason why it has moved forward in the direction that we and the rest of the members of the international community would like to see it move is through constant, consistent diplomatic pressure and we're in the process of continuing to do that.


There are outside efforts. The Save Darfur Coalition, for example, they have asked Senator -- Governor Bill Richardson to travel to Sudan. And we consulted with him prior to his departure and any of these outside efforts, anybody with some leverage or some "in" with the Sudanese Government that can possibly move them forward, certainly that is welcome.


Samir.


QUESTION: Sudan?


MR. MCCORMACK: Yes.


QUESTION: Salim Salim is the African Union mediator --


MR. MCCORMACK: Right.


QUESTION: -- is in Washington. Is he seeing anybody at State?


MR. MCCORMACK: I'll check for you. I'll check. Off the top of my head, I don't know, Samir. I'll check for you.


Joel.


QUESTION: Sean, each time there appear to be starts and stops and you've just highlighted -- I believe Arshad has just highlighted some of those.


MR. MCCORMACK: Right.


QUESTION: Way back about a year ago, the Bashir government and President Bashir himself was, I guess, nominated as the worst dictator in the world. Now, there was a briefing or a forum at Brookings some weeks ago with both Andrew Natsios and the French envoy also to the Sudan. And it was pointed out then that if they had the camps in Chad along the border, those camps would have to move another 300 miles inland into Chad to keep it away from the border. And it's a disparity, it appears, with the amount of troops or force that the Janjaweed are using. Has this been taken into account and is there any thought to implement a no-fly zone around Khartoum so that any types of military weaponry -- of course, you have the helicopters and the bombers, Russian bombers -- to put that into place now?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, look, Joel, certainly -- you mentioned Chad. Certainly, in addressing the situation in Darfur, you need to work with the Government of Chad in some respect. They have a problem along the border. There is also some of the violence that occurs in Darfur emanates from areas along that border so you need to deal with that. And you mentioned a no-fly zone. Others have mentioned that as an idea. Prime Minister Blair has put that out as an idea. And certainly, it's something that needs to be considered in that serious people are putting that out there. But at the moment, we are focused on the diplomatic track that we are on right now. That doesn't mean you think about, as I talked about with Arshad, what is Plan B and what are the elements of Plan B.


Farah.


QUESTION: Change of subject?


MR. MCCORMACK: Sure. Anything else on Sudan? Okay.


QUESTION: I'm just wondering, I know you don't want to predict what the President's going to say in his speech, but I'm just wondering --


MR. MCCORMACK: I figure that's a safe place to be.


QUESTION: How much input has been sought from like traditional U.S. allies on the idea of a surge?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, in general, talking about Iraq policy, of course we talk to our allies. The President met with Prime Minister Blair several weeks ago in the course of this review. Of course, we have contact with our close allies on the issue of Iraq in general. I'm not going to talk about any particular policy prescriptions that have been mentioned in the newspapers right now, but of course we've touched base with them.


QUESTION: Has anybody else -- I mean, are you hearing reactions? I mean, obviously, there are newspaper reports about a surge. Can you give us a sense of what reactions you're hearing diplomatically?


MR. MCCORMACK: I think that the diplomatic reaction will come when the President gives his remarks and people will have something that they can hold, they can look at, they understand is the official proposal and position of the United States, as articulated by the President. I think at that point they will have something to react to. Before then they are reacting to newspaper reports.


QUESTION: I guess I'm just reacting to the fact that this has -- you know, a few years ago, this was a U.S. -- you know, we really talked about a U.S.-led coalition and there was a big push on having others involved in contributions. And now, this seems to be a U.S. change in the way forward and we're not -- I'm just wondering if there has been any attempt to elicit support from some of these allies for --


MR. MCCORMACK: I think that, you know, the situation has changed somewhat on the ground. The period that you were talking about you actually had countries with significant forces on the ground and significant boots on the ground. You still do have multinational coalition partners with boots on the ground right now, but over time the emphasis has shifted to the Iraqis taking greater responsibility for their own security.


Now on some fronts, for example, with the army, that process has moved forward and you do have an army that is largely competent in doing what it has asked to do. Now, it is not able to do everything that a fully formed national army with long years of experience and training is able to do. For example, it still needs help with support, logistics, fire support, that sort of thing. But there are certainly elements -- if you talk to our U.S. military and they point out that they are very good and very competent. Now, they get better and better every single day as they get in the fight. So you've had a shift over time in responsibility for the security to the Iraqis. There's still a ways to go with that, as we can all see on the ground.


There is also similarly then a shift on the diplomatic front to try to have the international community help the Iraqis in other ways. Right now we have the International Compact for Iraq. That process has been underway. There was a meeting at the UN. There have been a number of meetings that we have had led by Deputy Secretary of Treasury Kimmitt. And the basic deal there is the Iraqis on one hand will take certain steps in terms of political and economic reform and in return members of the international community will pledge assistance of -- in a variety of different forms, whether that's debt relief or development assistance or diplomatic support or political support. So that's really the sort of basis of our efforts on the international front right now. So it has shifted over time as the situation has shifted over time and as the strategy in Iraq has developed. And you have also had over time various corrections to the tactics that we've been using.


Sue.


QUESTION: Has there been any renewed consideration of late of speaking to Iran over Iraq and using that channel?


MR. MCCORMACK: The Zal channel?


QUESTION: Yeah.


MR. MCCORMACK: Maybe we'll have to rename it some point, pending Senate confirmation, the Ryan channel or the Crocker channel?


QUESTION: Yeah. Crocker channel, yeah.


QUESTION: Crocker channel.


MR. MCCORMACK: We can put out a -- you know, have a contest here who can rename it.


No, there's nothing new to reporting that regard.


QUESTION: And the same with Syria then?


MR. MCCORMACK: Nothing new to report there.


QUESTION: Also Iraq. Any reaction to Jacques Chirac's comments a couple of days ago essentially that Iraq had turned out exactly as he'd predicted, not so well?


MR. MCCORMACK: I didn't see them. I didn't see the remarks.


QUESTION: On Somalia, there were a lot of reports out of the region that Jendayi Frazer had planned to go to Mogadishu over the weekend and had to cancel at the last minute for security reasons after news of the trip leaked.


MR. MCCORMACK: There was some thought given to it, but there was never a formal plan that people were comfortable with in terms of an international delegation going there. She would have been just a part of an international delegation. But instead, they had a very good meeting in Kenya in which members of the TFG were able to come to Kenya and that same international delegation was able to meet with them, have a good meeting with them.


But you know, Somalia has a long way to go. They have an opportunity here. The international community is focused on Somalia. They understand the needs and there is some demonstrated desire to help the Somali people not only on the security front, though more needs -- with the deployment of IGASOM -- although you need a significantly larger force than is currently slated to go there, and on the humanitarian front we ourselves have put forward some money in that regard and I think you're going to see more money being pledged. But the Somali people need to step up and seize this opportunity if they're going to have a -- if they're going to realize a better future for themselves. But they got a ways to go.


QUESTION: Have there been any contacts or any attempted contacts between U.S. officials and moderates in the Islamic Courts movement since the --


MR. MCCORMACK: Not that I'm aware of, not that I'm aware of.


QUESTION: Do you believe there are moderates in the Islamic Courts movement?


MR. MCCORMACK: We -- it's not a monolithic movement. Quite clearly, the most radical elements of the Islamic Courts were ascendant prior to the Ethiopian troops going into Mogadishu and we had some real concerns about the individuals that were exercising a leadership position over the Islamic Courts, some of whom had close ties to international terror. And that was a cause of deep concern for us, but they are not a monolithic grouping by reports that we have. And we talked about that when the Islamic Courts first emerged on the scene and we were hoping that a different element might emerge in the leadership of the Islamic Courts, but it didn't.


Sue.


QUESTION: Are you encouraging the Transitional Government to have contact with the Islamic Courts and to try and negotiate something with them?


MR. MCCORMACK: We're encouraging all parties who want to play a responsible role in Somali civil and political life to come together. Now is the time to do that. And whether that includes people who self-identify as members of the Islamic Courts, we leave that to the TFG and the Somali people. These have to be individuals that are dedicated to a peaceful -- a more peaceful, better future for Somalia, not individuals who are interested in providing safe haven for terrorists, for example. That is not obviously something that we would encourage, but there are some people who self-identify as members of the Islamic Courts. I don't think that that necessarily disqualifies an individual from participating and building a better future for Somalia as long as it is -- they do so on the basis and understanding that they're trying to build a more peaceful, stable future for Somalia, one that is not -- that doesn't resort to violence or consort with terror.


QUESTION: And are you confident that the Ethiopians will pull out when they said they're going to pull out and are you in close contact with them?


MR. MCCORMACK: I think the Somalia Contact Group is in touch with them and they have stated very clearly their desire to leave Somalia and Mogadishu, and that is appropriate. You also want to do that in such a way that you don't create a security vacuum in Mogadishu. And I understand that the Ugandan Government has talked about the fact that they -- pending receipt of the resources to do so, that they are prepared to deploy their troops towards the end of the month and that there's also a search on for more contributions to that IGASOM force, which they're going to need. So I think that's probably going to be a rolling discussion. But the Ethiopians understand that they do have to withdraw and the Somalia Contact Group understands that they do need to withdraw. You also don't want to create a security vacuum.


Yes, sir.


QUESTION: Thank you, Sean. This is Arshad with the Daily Inquilab. A question on Bangladesh.


MR. MCCORMACK: Right.


QUESTION: In Bangladesh political crisis is looming. Caretaker government has lately come under controversy, election commissions utterly in disarray and controversial. In this circumstances, Sean, will election in Bangladesh be fair and acceptable, and what is the reaction of the state in the wake of the blockade by the grand alliance today? There are a lot of people in the streets of Dhaka have been came under police action.


MR. MCCORMACK: Right.


QUESTION: So what is your reaction to that, may I?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, a free and fair transparent election not only on election day but in the run-up to the election day is a cornerstone of any democracy. And the caretaker government right now, we have urged them to create those conditions where all political parties and everybody who wants to be involved in Bangladesh's political -- democratic political life can do so and feel as though that when they cast their vote that it is going to be a vote that's recorded in the way that it should be and that their voice will be heard, whether or not they will -- their particular political candidate or political party wins is going to be up to those in the ballot box, but it needs to be free and fair. They need to have that opportunity.


And Under Secretary Nick Burns just last week spoke with the head of the caretaker government in Bangladesh to urge him to see that his government creates those conditions that would allow for a free, fair and transparent elections -- transparent election. I'm not sure to this point that we have seen them take those actions and we would encourage them to do so.


QUESTION: Just a follow-up to that. Ambassador Butenis on the ground met both the grand alliance leader Sheikh Hasina as well as the former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. Do you have any latest -- any deal that would really help them to come together? Is there any move by Ambassador Butenis on the ground to strike a deal between the two so that they come to an election process?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, we're -- the short answer is I don't have details of any meetings or any "deal" that may be emerging. Our Ambassador on the ground certainly is available to offer the good offices of that position to Somali* political parties, those involved in the political process who want to see a good election transpire in a peaceful environment. But ultimately, any of these decisions are going to -- any accommodations that are made are going to have to be among the Bangladeshis themselves.


QUESTION: Thank you, thank you.


MR. MCCORMACK: Yes.


QUESTION: On personnel changes, Sean. What will be -- if confirmed -- Ambassador Khalilzad's very first policy priority at the UN? You have your resolutions out on North Korea and Iran and you have the ceasefire functioning in Lebanon. What will be his very first area that he's going to have to tackle?


MR. MCCORMACK: That will be somewhat dependent on how the confirmation process goes forward. We are hopeful that this can be done in a speedy way. I'm sure Zal will do everything he can to provide all the information that he needs to provide it to the Senate so they can do so.


I would expect that all the issues that are currently on the agenda will remain on the agenda for some time. These are, I think, going to be hearty perennials for the international community and the Security Council for a time to come.


For example, Iran, North Korea, Sudan -- I am sure that during his tenure, if confirmed, he will have to deal with those. Management issues, management reform is going to be another issue that's at the top of his list. And then there are going to be other issues that from time to time will come to the attention -- need the high-level attention of the Security Council and other UN organizations, for example, like Somalia, like Burma. So I would expect that he will have his hands full while he's up there.


QUESTION: He'll have an easier confirmation process than Mr. Bolton did?


MR. MCCORMACK: I'm not going to try to predict how the confirmation process will go, but we hope that he has hearings scheduled at an early date and that he is able to proceed to a vote on the floor in a swift fashion. But again, that's the prerogative of the Senate.


Yes, ma'am.


QUESTION: Change of topic to Mexico. Mexico has sent 3,000 soldiers and federal police officers into Tijuana over the last couple days to crack down on drug trafficking and violent crimes. Given the situation in Tijuana, do you think there will be any plans to change travel advisories for U.S. tourists down there?


MR. MCCORMACK: I'm not aware of any plans right now, but what happens with these travel advisories is that the embassy, the relevant bureau back here, which would be Western Hemisphere Affairs, along with security folks and the Consular Affairs folks, will take a look at the situation and see if they need to update it. And that is a process that is done by the -- started out, certainly, by the professionals. They take a look at it with an objective eye as to the situation on the ground, and if we need to issue something, we will. But I don't have any particular information right now that we're going to.


Yes, ma'am.


QUESTION: Japan has upgraded its defense agency to a Defense Ministry Tuesday, so can I have your comment on that?


MR. MCCORMACK: Excuse me. I'm sorry.


QUESTION: Japan upgraded its defense agency to a Defense Ministry on Tuesday. So can I have your comment on that?


MR. MCCORMACK: I think that that's really a matter for the Japanese Government. I don't think we would really offer a comment on that.


Yes, sir.


QUESTION: Can I follow up on that? There were some press reports that the U.S. needed Japan to discuss an "emergency" in the Taiwan Straits and how Japan and China -- I mean, Japan and the United States -- to cooperate on that? Have you anything --


MR. MCCORMACK: No information on that.


QUESTION: Thank you.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/78469.htm

MR. MCCORMACK: Good afternoon, everybody. We will put out the paper statements on the Secretary's travel after the briefing, but I think you have all the information so we can get right into your questions, whoever wants to start.


QUESTION: What are you prepared to say about developments in Somalia?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, there have been numerous media reports about Pentagon DOD activities going after senior al-Qaida operatives that were resident in Somalia. I believe the Department of Defense has confirmed that on Sunday they did have an operation going after a high-level or senior al-Qaida operative that was operating in Somalia. I don't have any more details beyond that. I don't know how much more the Department of Defense is going to be willing to go into the details of the operation or whom it was going after, so you know what I know in terms of the operation.


QUESTION: But can you talk about diplomatic contacts with, say, Kenya and Ethiopia?


MR. MCCORMACK: Specifically with respect to that operation, I don't have any information for you, George. Clearly, we are in close contact with all the governments in the region concerning Somalia. We recently had a Somali Contact Group meeting there. Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer attended on our behalf. We co-chaired it. So we're working very closely with the governments in the region.


We have a concern that those terrorist operatives that were in Somalia -- operating in Somalia not be able to escape and flee and to try to establish safe haven elsewhere. So very clearly that has been one of our interests. We have military assets in the region. The other governments in the region -- the Ethiopians, the Kenyans as well as others -- understand that concern. I don't think that they want to see any al-Qaida or terrorist operatives be able to escape Somalia and try to set up camp either in their country or a neighboring country.


Yeah.


QUESTION: If Ethiopia or anyone else hands over any of these so-called al-Qaida operatives, would they be classified as enemy combatants and sent to Guantanamo Bay or what would happen to them?


MR. MCCORMACK: That is a several times over hypothetical question that I couldn't even begin to answer at this point.


QUESTION: Not really. But what would they be classified as?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, it is actually really because you need to know the details. The lawyers always ask for details regarding these things, and I have no information that that is, in fact, the case right now. If we were, in fact, faced with that situation, of course, our lawyers would look into it. They would make judgments based upon our laws and our obligations under international treaty obligations.


QUESTION: But some of these people are named on U.S. most wanted lists, people who you are looking for --


MR. MCCORMACK: A lot of that depends on whether or not they already have indictments in the United States, whether those are unsealed or sealed. So again, you're getting into the range of the hypothetical. You need to deal with details first.


Yeah, Kirit.


QUESTION: You mentioned concerns that these al-Qaida terrorists might be able to set up camp in other countries in the region.


MR. MCCORMACK: Right.


QUESTION: Can you talk about their ability to operate within Somalia and your concerns there?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, that was a longstanding concern. We had talked about that for some time that -- and Somalia was for the past 20 years or so has no effective government. It was an environment in which terrorists could carve out a niche if they, in fact, worked with some of the local warlords, some of the tribal leaders, work out arrangements whereby they could stay there. And so that had been a longstanding concern on the part of the United States as well as others in the region.


So now we have a situation where the Ethiopian army has gone in there. They have effectively taken control of Mogadishu to hand over to the Transitional Federal Institutions, as well as the southern parts of Somalia. And those terrorists no longer have a safe haven in which to operate, or at least to live in which they can count on not being hunted down. So they are trying to, we presume, make their way out of Somalia, and in doing so we want to try to get our hands on them.


QUESTION: I just want to make sure. Are you saying that they aren't able to operate in Somalia anymore?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, certainly not in the way that they were able to previously. Previously, they had -- and again, I can't speak to any specific arrangements that an individual may have had, but presumably they operated there either with the cooperation or -- of a tribal or clan leader, other sort of resident of Somalia, in which they were provided some form of protection. They clearly can't do that now. That -- the situation is changed, I imagine for them, dramatically on the ground. You have Ethiopian forces there. You have the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions moving in. Granted, those are relatively weak institutions, but they have a dramatically different situation on the ground right now.


QUESTION: And Sunday's attack has furthered their inability to operate?


MR. MCCORMACK: I'll let DOD talk to exactly whom -- who they were going after and what they think the level of effectiveness of the attack was.


QUESTION: And you couldn't say whether these were the guys who were responsible for the embassy bombing?


MR. MCCORMACK: Again, you'll have to talk to DOD about who they were going after.


Nicholas.


QUESTION: Sean, I think Javier Solana has proposed sort of a peacekeeping force for Somalia under the UN. Do you have any comments on that at all, or how do you see what happened today or late last night in terms of the whole diplomacy effort that you have in the region?


MR. MCCORMACK: In terms of the DOD operation, I'm not sure it really affects anything with regard to the Somali Contact Group or the ongoing diplomacy to rally international support to assist the Somali people.


QUESTION: And we can assume that the Secretary knew about this in advance, right, about the military operation?


MR. MCCORMACK: I haven't asked her, Nicholas. I don't know.


In terms of the question you raise about a UN force, what Mr. Solana has talked about, there are ongoing discussions regarding the IGASOM force and how to make that a robust enough force in terms of resources to help provide some security in Mogadishu, in Somalia. Right now, the force stands at about 1,200 Ugandans. They have very -- they have generously said that they would step up and they would provide some forces and some resources and equipment for that mission. They need some assistance in terms of financial assistance. We are providing some of that in part. It's about a total of $20 or $30 million that they needed to -- for that deployment, so we're helping out with that.


But you're going to need more than 1,200 troops on the ground in a city of several million people, Mogadishu, to try to help provide a security environment where the Somalis can actually start building these institutions that will form the basis of their government and help rebuild a civil society in Somalia.


So the question then is, well, from where do those resources come and how do you generate them. Now, one way to do that is a UN-mandated or a UN force. So that's an idea, I think, that is among the international community being actively discussed. I don't think at this point there is a consensus on the international mechanism that would be used to generate and sustain that force, but there is a widespread agreement that there needs to be a more robust force because as the Ethiopians pull out of Somalia, pull out of Mogadishu, you don't want to create a security vacuum because that leads you right back into the situation where the Somali people found themselves previously, in a very chaotic environment and perhaps even worse off. You don't want -- the international community does not want to see that happen. That was a very clear feeling coming out of the Somali Contact Group over the past couple days.


QUESTION: So you're not saying that you would necessarily support a UN force, you're just saying that there needs to be something to help the Ugandans?


MR. MCCORMACK: It's one of the options being discussed, Nicholas. You know, I can't say that --


QUESTION: It's too early to tell?


MR. MCCORMACK: -- that we have -- we or others have really come down on one side or the other. But clearly, it's an option because you need to have a force in there that is robust enough to help work with the Transitional Federal Institutions to provide the security environment and the UN is one way to do that.


One other point about this, too. The Somali people have an opportunity here. This is all about how do we help the Somali people take advantage of the opportunity that they have right now. There is a level of international focus on Somalia and its various issues. And they have an opportunity to maybe not turn the clock back all the way, but turn the clock back a bit where you have these internationally recognized institutions that could form the basis of a government and around which people can rally.


Now it is up to the Somali people, the Somali leadership, the leadership of the Transitional Federal Institutions to reach out and try to rally the leaders among the Somali political class, leaders among Somali society to those institutions and to that common cause of charting a better pathway for Somalia. Now that's a -- it's going to be a long pathway because it is a country and people that have suffered greatly over the past couple of decades from humanitarian deprivations, from extreme violence in many cases, so they need a lot of help, but they all -- they need to begin by helping themselves and to coming together around this common set of institutions.


Yeah.


QUESTION: You said U.S. doesn't support a UN force, a UN peace force? Would you support an African Union force?


MR. MCCORMACK: I'm just saying that there are a number of different ideas that are out there right now. I don't think we've come down on one side or the other. It certainly is a possibility that exists. People are talking about it, Javier Solana has talked about it. It certainly does have some attractive aspects to it in being able to -- having it as a mechanism that -- through which you can generate a robust force, it can help provide some security in Somalia and also has the additional feature of providing a mechanism whereby you can continue to support that. There's a way to -- there's a way to do that, as opposed to ad hoc donations, such as we have with the IGASOM deployment.


Now, that isn't to say that at the end of the day, the consensus won't be to go that direction. It could very well be. But there are a lot of different needs for these kind of forces even in this region. So you have to take a look at what are the needs, for example, in Somalia, what are the needs in Sudan and how best can we accomplish both of those missions because, in essence, you're also sort of drawing from some of the same pools in terms of forces. But there have been some African states that have suggested that they would be willing to contribute forces to an expanded IGASOM force in Somalia.


So bottom line is -- the short answer is working with members of the international community to find the right formula to meet our goals.


Yeah.


QUESTION: Now that the Islamists are out and the weak transitional government is in, are you considering sending in a diplomatic team to Mogadishu because thus far you've been working out of Nairobi?


MR. MCCORMACK: No plans at this point. We have met with the transitional federal government institution -- Transitional Federal Institution leadership. We met with them in Kenya. At this point there's no -- there are no plans for U.S. diplomats to go to Mogadishu. That was something that was considered for a period of time at the end of last week over the weekend. Final decision was made that we -- the security concerns regarding our personnel outweighed at that point the potential diplomatic benefits of going to Mogadishu. So the way around that was to actually have the TFI representatives come down to Kenya. And we think -- and we had good meetings with them. So there was some positive there. It also I think highlighted the fact that there is a way to go on -- a ways to go in terms of the Somali political class really coming together in a cohesive way.


Yeah.


QUESTION: Would you mind just commenting on reports that Ethiopian intelligence has worked very closely with the United States on locating these people and helping with this assault?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, Ethiopia has an interest in seeing that these individuals don't -- aren't able to flee Somalia and for example set up shop or try to set up shop in Ethiopia, try to commit acts of terror in Ethiopia. So yes, in the Horn of Africa, we do have an active effort to fight terrorism and there are a variety of different aspects to this. It's information sharing, working with the countries of the region to help build up their border security capabilities whether that's, you know, helping them out with computer systems so they can check people in and out or actually building an infrastructure. There are military to military relationships, for example, military exchanges, military training. We have some with Ethiopia. It's not very large; it's about $2.5 million. And so that all exists in the Horn of Africa. I can't tell you specifically whether or not we have received information in these cases from Ethiopia, but we do have an active counterterrorism operation cooperative effort in the Horn of Africa.


QUESTION: Also you did mention that some other African states have -- they're ready to send -- contribute to this force. Can you give specific at this stage or --


MR. MCCORMACK: I'm going to let them speak for themselves. But it was some initial expressions of interest. We have also gone out to a couple of African states suggesting that they might either themselves consider it or find a way to rally support on the continent for such a mission.


Yes, sir.


QUESTION: Change of subject?


MR. MCCORMACK: Sure. Anything else on Somalia? No? Okay.


QUESTION: The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated Iran's Bank of Sepah as an institution that is facilitating Iran's weapons program.


MR. MCCORMACK: Right.


QUESTION: I would like to ask whether there are other -- should we expect further Iranian entities and Iranian financial institutions that are going to be sanctioned by the U.S.?


And my second question is: Are you in contact with other countries, other states, regarding this issue and are you persuading them to take similar steps?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, in terms of prospectively are we going to designate other entities under this executive order, well, it certainly is a possibility but we would never speak in advance of those activities. And in any case, those are based on the facts. There are requirements under the law and regulation before we designate any individuals or entities under this executive order. I can only say that in this particular case there was substantial evidence that led us to this action today.


In terms of working with other states, absolutely we are working with other states. It's important -- an important aspect of fighting nonproliferation in the international community is exchange of information about the lifeblood to those operations. And that really is the -- these financial networks and the either front companies or those legitimate institutions that are unwittingly, or perhaps wittingly, serving as funnels for these kind of funds. What you want to do is be able to work cooperatively with other states as well as individual financial institutions to educate them about what it is that we know regarding Iranian WMD procurement activities and missile procurement activities, and out of that you can have a good information exchange. Based on that information exchange, sometimes you can glean useful, actionable information.


So that is very much a part of what we are doing and we are under UN Security Council Resolution 1737 working very actively with other states. This is a Chapter 7 resolution and states are obliged, regardless of whether or not they supported the resolution, to comply with its terms. So we are going to act under the terms of those resolutions. We are also going to work closely with other states based on their own national laws, looking at what actions they might take to ensure that we do not have a situation where Iran is able to continue to build up its nuclear weapons program.


Yeah, Kirit.


QUESTION: (Inaudible) if have a full answer for it. I'm just wondering if you knew whether Iran knew this was coming before the announcement today.


MR. MCCORMACK: I can't tell you. Can't tell you.


Yes, sir.


QUESTION: It was reported today that a plane crashed in Iraq and 30 Turkish construction workers and one American died. Do you have any reaction on that?


MR. MCCORMACK: I am aware of the reports of the plane crash. I don't have information about the nationalities of those onboard that crash. There were -- I do understand that there were fatalities and that's sad. It's sad for the families of those involved. But beyond that, I don't have any other details. Certainly, our thoughts go out to those who lost loved ones.


Yes, sir.


QUESTION: Sean, on Mexico. As you know, President Calderon, after ten days of taking position, he launched an amazing military operations against drug smuggling. Now they are working along the border in Tijuana area. How the U.S. is seeing that operation and what it's doing to prevent that many criminals just come across the United States trying to escape the Mexican authorities?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, it's certainly very encouraging that the Mexican Government is taking steps to go after those networks that are responsible for the smuggling of drugs. And we all know that around those networks there's always also a great deal of violence that grows up around them. So it is very encouraging. We certainly have worked very cooperatively with the Mexican Government in the past on efforts to break up these rings, prevent -- help try to prevent any illegal activities that they may be engaged in. So I would expect that that cooperation carries over into the Calderon administration. I know that when he was here, President Calderon talked about the fact that this was an important priority for him and for his administration, and we look forward to working with him and his government on it.


QUESTION: Are you concerned that maybe they try to escape to the U.S.? I mean, are you taking some precautions along the border to prevent --


MR. MCCORMACK: You would have to talk to our officials over at Department of Homeland Security and perhaps in the local and state law enforcement along those border states.


QUESTION: Well, do you have any comment to the statements, the insults of President Hugo Chavez to the Secretary of the OAS?


MR. MCCORMACK: It seems like he is kind of thin-skinned. Part of democracy in the hemisphere and promotion of democracy is the ability of leaders of institutions like the OAS to be able to speak out clearly and frankly about what it is that they see. That's part of the democratic spirit and the democratic ethos. We've seen these kind of reactions before from President Chavez.


Nicholas.


QUESTION: Sean, on the Secretary's travels, the Defense Secretary actually has also announced that he is going to go to the region and it appears that those trips might be quite close in terms of timing. Is the Secretary coordinating any perhaps mutual visits with Secretary Gates anywhere along the way?


MR. MCCORMACK: Nicholas, these travel schedules are separate.


QUESTION: All right.


MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.


QUESTION: To follow up on his question, you have been speaking about openings in the Middle East between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but the situation seems very tense right now --


MR. MCCORMACK: Sure.


QUESTION: -- in between Palestinians themselves, between Israel and the Palestinians, between Israel and the moderate Arabs. The last meeting between Olmert and Barak went very wrong. So --


MR. MCCORMACK: I guess I --


QUESTION: -- what kind of opening and what kind of objectives she can achieve there?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, in terms of the tensions between Hamas and Fatah, I think those are quite clear. And the root cause of -- at the root of those is really unresolved political contradictions that the Palestinians themselves need to come to terms with and resolve through their political process. So that is something that they need to do.


For our part, we're working with President Abbas and the presidency on ways to help strengthen those institutions that support peaceful resolution of differences between Israelis and the Palestinians.


President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert actually had a very, very good meeting, from all reports that I saw. Prime Minister Olmert talked about the release of $100 million worth of tax revenues and it is important that that dialogue continue between two political leaders that are committed to a peaceful pathway.


In terms of the meeting with Prime Minister Olmert and President Mubarak, putting aside the atmospherics resulting from the raid in Ramallah, it was actually a very good meeting, from all reports that we had. These are, again, two leaders that are committed to trying to promote peace and stability throughout the region and who are committed to fighting violent extremism in the region, which puts them on the opposite side of the fence from groups like Hamas, Syria and Iran.


In terms of the Secretary's travels, this is a trip where I expect that she is going to have some extended conversations with her counterparts and leaders in the region about how to address and confront the various threats that are -- that we face in common in the region: how to move forward on a variety of different fronts, including the Israeli-Palestinian front, how is it that we can exploit this opening that we believe exists and that many others in the region exist; how is it that we can help support those forces of moderation in the region, for example the government of Prime Minister Siniora; how is it that we can help those in Iraq who are fighting every single day for a more democratic, peaceful future for their country against the forces of extremism.


So that's really the outlines of what she's going to be talking about in very broad strokes. I would expect that this is a trip that is more about laying the foundations for potential future actions than actually coming to closure on any particular agreements.


QUESTION: So Iraq will also be part of the discussions?


MR. MCCORMACK: I would expect it will be. Yes, part of the stop in -- all along the way, I would expect that the topics of the Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq would come up. I would expect also discussions about the perception of a common threat posed by Iran and for other forces of extremism and violence in the region -- violent extremism in the region.


QUESTION: Well, that was part of my question. How large a component of her meetings do you expect Iraq to be and will she be essentially defending the al-Maliki government? Some of the people she's going to see have expressed some reservations about his ability to get this job done.


MR. MCCORMACK: I don't think "defending" is the word that we would use. It's no secret that we have encouraged states in the region, whether it's Egypt or Saudi Arabia or the Gulf states, to offer their support to the Government of Iraq led by Prime Minister Maliki, whether that is through debt relief or through political support or diplomatic support or other kinds of support. And we will, of course, continue to do so. And that feeds into the dialogue that we are encouraging regarding the International Compact for Iraq. That process continues to move forward. It's, I don't think at this point, ripe for a meeting in which the Iraqis state very clearly this is what we're -- this is what we are willing to do in terms of our side and then the rest of the members of the compact state clearly what they are willing to do. The process is moving forward, it's making progress, but it hasn't yet come to that point of fruition.


In terms of dividing up -- how is she going to divide her time, I think it will probably vary along each stop. But I would expect on stops other than meeting with the Palestinians and the Israelis that you have a conversation really about the region. And one way in which that will manifest itself publicly is in Kuwait there will be a GCC+2 meeting, so that's really a forum where she and her counterparts can get together really to cover the whole range of issues that confront us as well as others in the region.


QUESTION: One follow. When the time is ripe, as you say, for an actual Iraq contact group meeting, that would presumably include Iran; is that right?


MR. MCCORMACK: It has in the past, yeah. The one we had up in New York included Iran and Syria, yeah.


Yes, sir.


QUESTION: Following up on what you just said about Kuwait, is that the primary --


MR. MCCORMACK: Oh, congratulations on the Florida Gators, by the way.


QUESTION: Oh, thank you very much. Happy to get that into the record. If you'd like to say more on that, go ahead. (Laughter.)


MR. MCCORMACK: I'm nonpartisan in that regard. There are a lot of Ohio State fans with long faces around the Department today.


QUESTION: My heart goes out to them. (Laughter.) Anyway, boy, you really know how to throw me off. (Laughter.)


On the -- is the GCC+2 in Kuwait the Secretary's main agenda itinerary for the Kuwait visit, and could you discuss at all on any issues whether she would hope to have any bilateral talks with Kuwait and how Kuwait sort of fits into all the things you've just been talking about?


MR. MCCORMACK: I'm sure there will be some bilateral contacts. As we get closer to the trip and the schedule gets fleshed out in more refined detail, we'll be happy to share those details with you. I'm sure there will be a bilateral component to the trip. Kuwait is a very good friend, a good friend and ally in the region. We have a long history together and the Secretary looks forward to visiting Kuwait for the first time other than transiting through Kuwait.


Sue.


QUESTION: Are there any plans for a Quartet meeting?


MR. MCCORMACK: On this trip, no. On this trip, no.


QUESTION: And in London are there going to be any P-5+1 meetings or anything else?


MR. MCCORMACK: I think it'll be bilateral. I think that she will see Foreign Secretary Beckett and perhaps Prime Minister Blair, but I don't know if that's been -- what Prime Minister Blair's schedule looks like.


QUESTION: And what are you hoping for the GCC+2 countries to do in terms of Iraq? Are you hoping they'll come up with a statement at the end of the meeting or a statement of support or money or --


MR. MCCORMACK: Let's -- we'll see. Keep your eye on that space.


Yes, sir.


QUESTION: Yeah, on Russia and Belarus, has the United States offered to help resolve the dispute in any way, perhaps mediation or even seeking alternative ways to get energy to Central Europe?


MR. MCCORMACK: I think that they -- this is a dispute between Russia and Belarus and they need to work it out for themselves. But what this -- this does provide a lesson, I think, to all who might be watching that it's important to (a) develop multiple sources of energy supply and (B) develop multiple means by which to transport those supplies of energy. I think we have seen a number of different examples over the past year that have really pointed to both of those lessons and the importance of those.


Yeah.


QUESTION: On North Korea, China's Wu Daiwei has said that the BDA financial (inaudible). Can you confirm that and whether the location is still going to be New York?


MR. MCCORMACK: I checked on this yesterday, and as of yesterday there was no agreement on a date or the location. We suggested New York. We'll try to keep you up to date and you also might check with Treasury. They're really the point of contact for those.


QUESTION: Why North Korea going to want to reject the place New York and let like Beijing?


MR. MCCORMACK: Again, I understand the point, and the point here is that these discussions about the financial issues are separate and apart from the six-party talks.


QUESTION: You were speaking before about a Quartet meeting.


MR. MCCORMACK: Right.


QUESTION: If it's not during this trip, could it be during the second trip at the end of the month?


MR. MCCORMACK: It's possible.


QUESTION: In the margin of the Paris conference?


MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, it's possible. Yeah. Well, I'm not going to --


QUESTION: It is not decided?


MR. MCCORMACK: We will not be hosting the next Quartet meeting, so I'll let whoever the hosts are of the next meeting announce it out of courtesy.


QUESTION: Thank you.


MR. MCCORMACK: Oh, we have one more. Back here.


QUESTION: Is the State Department revising its previous estimates of how many Iraqi refugees it will let into the U.S. this year?


MR. MCCORMACK: The situation as it stands now is that we are working with UNHCR, as are other countries, regarding the humanitarian needs of those people who have left Iraq and are now in Jordan, Syria and other countries in the region. I think the bulk of those people are in Jordan and Syria.


Now, UNHCR has the job of helping to provide humanitarian assistance for those individuals but also assessing their claims for refugee status. That's -- in this process that's something that they -- a job that they fulfill.


Now, in terms of the United States and potential refugees from Iraq, we have a commitment to take a look at all the cases referred to us by the UNHCR of those people who have been classified as refugees. That is something that applies worldwide. So in the case of Iraqis, if there are individuals who have been classified as refugees and who have been designated as individuals who would benefit from resettlement, we will take a look at those cases, all those cases referred to us.


Now, in terms of the overall numbers, we don't have any specific caps on countries or by region. We have target numbers and there have already been a number of, based on the funding that we have, there have already been a number of different people that -- I think tens of thousands, about 50,000 that we have committed to in terms of refugee resettlement over the past year. But there are, again, no caps at the moment on that kind of resettlement. But we are now just beginning, I think, to work with UNHCR on the issue in a more concerted fashion as there have been greater numbers that have showed up in Jordan and Syria and elsewhere.


QUESTION: But in the U.S. specifically?


MR. MCCORMACK: In the U.S. -- well, you have to go through that process in order to get to the U.S. You have to have been designated, given refugee status by UNHRC and then accepted in by a country in order to be resettled. And those in the United States have already gone through that process.


QUESTION: Okay.


MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.


QUESTION: Do you have anything on Andrew Natsios's visit to China? Who has he spoken to? What has he achieved? Where is he at in terms of his trip?


MR. MCCORMACK: I don't. I'll check for you. I haven't talked to him.


Okay, great.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/78511.htm

MR. MCCORMACK: Good afternoon, everybody.

QUESTION: Good afternoon.


MR. MCCORMACK: Good afternoon to you, Lambros. How are you?


QUESTION: Very well. Happy New Year.


MR. MCCORMACK: Good. Happy new year to you. I don't have any opening statements, so we can get right into your questions.


QUESTION: We'll let Lambros ask his question and get it out of the way.


MR. MCCORMACK: All right, Lambros. (Laughter.)


QUESTION: May I?


MR. MCCORMACK: You're a leadoff hitter.


QUESTION: Oh, there is a new era in here. (Laughter.)


MR. MCCORMACK: You have the floor. You have the floor, Lambros.


QUESTION: Okay. Mr. McCormack, yesterday Under Secretary Nicholas Burns during a visit at the Greek Embassy with the presence of Greek Ambassador Mallias, in answer to a question of Cyprus stated inter alia, "We think, we hope that 2007 could be a year of Cyprus. And UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is now putting together a team. We hope that there will be even senior Americans on that team in the new UN effort to try to resolve finally the problems that have stemmed from the invasion of Cyprus 30 years ago." A similar statement was made by Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Bryza before yesterday, in answer to a question of mine with the presence of the Turkish Ambassador, Mr. Sensoy, during a conference at Sofitel Hotel here in Washington. I'm wondering based on what you are so optimistic, so clear that 2007 will be the Cyprus year for a final solution.


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, we hope that all the relevant parties can come together to once again try to find a solution to this very difficult long-standing problem. Secretary General Annan made tremendous efforts to propose a solution that was put to the test of the voters and ultimately the Greek Cypriots decided against it. They voted against it. And so I think that in the wake of that there wasn't much interest among the members of the international community for reenergizing efforts to try to come to a solution. But I think we have gotten to a point now where enough interested parties in the region have expressed an interest in maybe trying again to find a solution; that the UN has taken another look at this issue and they may consider what it is that they might do. We support them in those efforts. And should they decide to move forward with a new effort to try to find a solution, we would certainly support them in those efforts, but we would be in a supporting role.


Yeah, Sylvie.


QUESTION: Can you confirm a new U.S. raid in south of Somalia today?


MR. MCCORMACK: I can't, no. There are -- let me -- in terms of any questions about ongoing operations, you can talk to the Department of Defense about that. We do as a U.S. Government have an ongoing interest in seeing that those who are involved in terrorism, members of terrorist organizations, those who are known to have perpetrated acts of terrorism against the United States, U.S. interests or its friends and allies. We want to make sure that those individuals are not able to flee Somalia, where they previously had enjoyed safe haven or at least, at the very least, the protection of some individuals in Somalia.


So as a U.S. Government, do we have an interest in seeing that they aren't allowed to leave Somalia and that, if possible, they are brought to justice? Absolutely. But I'm not going to comment on any particular effort in that regard. You all know that we do have military assets in the area. It's been publicly acknowledged that we do have naval assets off the coast of Somalia in that Horn of Africa region. We do have an active anti-terrorism effort in the Horn of Africa based out of Djibouti, and that's a cooperative effort with neighbors in the region. But it's not my role to really talk about any sort of ongoing or planned operations that we may have.


Sue.


QUESTION: Could you comment on criticism from the European Union, Italy and others about the U.S. military action in Somalia? They say that all this will do is stoke up hostilities in the region and cause further problems.


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, you know, of course we're sympathetic to the idea that you don't want to -- in your counterterrorism efforts you don't want to create more problems for yourself. But also senior policymakers, senior officials involved in our counterterrorism efforts are paid to make difficult judgments about those sorts of tradeoffs. When do you have actionable intelligence? When do you have an opportunity to either prevent a terrorist act or to go after those who either are planning them or have perpetrated them? And those are -- there's not a cookie-cutter answer to that. They do it on a case-by-case basis.


And all of these various considerations go into deciding how to approach a given situation and there may be criticism of that, but of course that comes with the territory. And we would hope that after -- inasmuch as we can provide information and facts to our friends and allies about what it is that we have or plan to do, then we'll do so. There are obviously constraints on that. And if they are not supportive of those efforts, well then that's sometimes just the way it works out. But of course we -- of course we're sensitive to the idea that in protecting the United States and its interests we also have to do the cost-benefit analysis. But at the end of the day, we're going to err on the side of protecting the American people and protecting American interests.


QUESTION: And there are also conflicting reports on the ground as to the death toll. Are you going to at some point be able to release a U.S. estimate as to how many died? The Somalis say it's many -- could be up to 50.


MR. MCCORMACK: Right. If there's any information to be provided in that regard, if it's appropriate to come from the State Department, then I'll be happy to talk about it. But if others -- if it's more appropriate for others to talk about it, then others will talk about it, but I don't have any additional information that I can offer you.


Nicholas.


QUESTION: Sean, I think part of the criticism that she was talking about has arisen out of the fact that your allies say they didn't know about what was going to happen militarily in Somalia. Yesterday you said that you hadn't spoken to the Secretary to see whether she knew about it in advance, but are you aware of any contacts with European allies to --who are involved in Somalia to inform them that such a strike was --


MR. MCCORMACK: I don't know. You can talk to DOD about that.


QUESTION: But you are in charge of diplomacy with --


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I know but they are also mil-to-mil relationships as well and those would be actually the appropriate channels more likely than not, that those communications would go through. I can't tell you whether or not there was any discussion beforehand. Very frequently in counterterrorism operations you have to maintain a certain amount of operational security around them. That doesn't mean that there's a lack of trust there, but those are the hard facts of conducting counterterrorist operations.


Yeah, Kirit.


QUESTION: Can I change the subject?


MR. MCCORMACK: Anything else on Somalia?


QUESTION: Iraq?


MR. MCCORMACK: Sure.


QUESTION: Senior Administration official just said that there's a plan to double the number of PRTs in Iraq. I'm wondering if you have any information about that.


MR. MCCORMACK: I would recommend that you stay tuned to the President's remarks tonight. If there's anything more to say about expanding the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams that we have on the ground in Iraq, then we'll be happy to provide you more details on it. Currently there are -- I think the last count is seven U.S. PRTs and three coalition PRTs, meaning they were staffed by other members of the multinational force, so there's a total of ten right now.


QUESTION: Do you have any -- I mean, could you give us an assessment of their progress so far?


MR. MCCORMACK: We think it's a very important part of certainly the State Department's efforts in Iraq to really get out to work with provincial and local leaders to -- on a whole variety of different issues, whether that's talking with them about building up the governing institutions in the outlining areas outside of Baghdad, working with them on local projects, working with them on, you know, individual entrepreneurs, with microfinance. That's another very interesting program that is ongoing has really shown results. And it's the kind of program that has demonstrated positive returns all around the globe. As a matter of fact, the latest Nobel Peace Prize Laureate is actually the person who started the programs in Bangladesh several decades ago.


So the PRTs are a very important element not only in getting out beyond Baghdad and working at the state and at the provisional and local level, but they are also important for the fact that they are the nexus in the field outside of Baghdad, outside of the headquarters elements, of the State Department and Department of Defense, that civil-military cooperation that is very, very important anytime you're dealing with counterinsurgency operations; that once you are able to confront the bad guys, whoever they may be, that you are able to flow in behind that with civil-military reconstruction efforts, efforts to work with local leaders to promote projects that are of interest to the local population, whether that's cleaning up the streets or painting schools or building schools or those kind of projects.


So that's a big chunk of what the PRTs -- these are the people that are really on the ground out there in the provinces, in the cities and the small localities working with Iraqis at the grassroots to help them build up those democratic institutions outside of the capital.


Sue.


QUESTION: I think the U.S. Government has disbursed over $16 billion so far in reconstruction assistance. I think it's about 16 billion of the -- I know we've got 22 billion in total but --


MR. MCCORMACK: It's about 80 percent has been -- 80 percent, I think, of the 20 billion --


QUESTION: Mm-hmm, or 22 billion.


MR. MCCORMACK: -- has been spent and I think the other -- the remaining 20 percent has been obligated. Roughly.


QUESTION: Right. Now, the President is suggesting another billion or so which will go into reconstruction and jobs. Why do you think that this extra billion or so will make any difference at all in turning the situation around?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, first of all, as for any --


QUESTION: Or do you think additional reconstruction funds --


MR. MCCORMACK: First of all, as for the details of the President's speech and the strategy that he's going to outline, I suggest you wait until 9:01:30 tonight. You can tune in and you can hear it. But again, as I pointed out with Kirit, it is very important in counterinsurgency operations, and you can look at -- talk to all the experts, look at all the manuals, it's very important that once you have a cessation of the military operations in an area, in a small area, that you're able to flow in with the civil-military teams behind them, work with the local leaders, work on the local small-scale construction projects that have a real effect on people's daily lives. It is very important to help the Iraqis both rebuild their large-scale infrastructure -- we're talking power plants and power lines and oil, the oil pipelines and roads and sewage treatment and water plants, all of those things -- because they were really neglected under Saddam Hussein. It was really a decrepit infrastructure, and particularly outside of Baghdad. So that was important money to have spent.


We made a transition, I don't know, about a year or so ago, about a year, year and a half ago, to focus more on the smaller-scale projects because we understood that these are the projects that will have an immediate effect on people's lives. You know, building the power plant it may take some time and eventually they may get more hours of electricity, but they don't see any immediate benefit to that. And what we have learned and what we know is that there needs to be an immediate -- a more immediate demonstration of the benefits of working with the central government, working with the coalition forces as you're fighting insurgents, terrorists or sectarian militias, demonstrate to them that there are positive benefits that will flow from investing in that political process.


And you can do that over the short term, which is what we're talking about with the PRTs, but there also has to be some long-term expenditures to help with the large-scale infrastructure. And there are still a lot of needs in that regard and the Iraqis, I think, are going to be stepping up to that as well as perhaps others in the international community.


Yeah, Kirit.


QUESTION: The Secretary and President Bush met with or at least via videoconference a few of the PRT leaders, I think three in Baghdad and then one here last month.


MR. MCCORMACK: Right, right.


QUESTION: Can you say whether this decision came out of that discussion or what they --


MR. MCCORMACK: No -- well, I'll let the President talk about his own decisions. First of all, the predicate to the question is that there is the expansion, so nice try. But I think it is safe to say, because the President has spoken in public about this, that he was -- how impressed he was by the effectiveness of the program but also by the people who were leading these teams. These were experienced people who have a lot of years in dealing with just these kinds of issues and they were able to give him a real view from what's going on on the ground outside of Baghdad.


And it's also a program that has the full support of Secretary Rice. She went to Mosul to announce the startup of this program and introduced the first PRT to the media and to the rest of the world and to the Iraqis. So it's a program that she is very keen on and thinks it is very effective. And I think that the President in being able to talk one-on-one with these individuals also came away impressed by the dedication and the skill and the effectiveness of not only the program but the people.


Yeah, Joel.


QUESTION: Sean, in the recent past we've seen where following the war in the Middle East between Hezbollah and Israel, following the destruction of the section in south Beirut Hezbollah raced into that area and handed out gobs of money to people to rebuild their particular homes and apartments. Now, obviously that may have been for political purposes. What's to say that right now the way the -- in Baghdad the way the population, and Sadr City and other locations within the city are thinking -- now, this is not just for Baghdad but I would assume also for country wide -- Fallujah, Najaf, elsewhere. What's to prevent the Maliki government who cannot contain some of this violence to suddenly see other groups, Sunnis and Shiites, funneling money in there for those political purposes to maybe derail the infrastructure plans?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, you do have outside groups and countries meddling in Iraq's internal affairs in a negative way and we've talked about that. Iran and Syria are two prime examples of that. It is important that the central government, any central government, demonstrate to the people that they should invest in the political process and support the political process, support the democratic institutions that are part of that political process. But as in any democracy the government has to respond to the needs of the people and if those needs are not being met in some regard in these fledging democracies, they're going to look elsewhere.


So certainly there are a bunch of different components to this. There needs to be responsible effective government that provides for the needs of the people and you also need to work to make sure that those outside groups in countries that are trying to negatively effect the situation in the country aren't able to do so, either by getting them -- requesting that they stop or conducting -- engaging in actions that will make them less effective in their ability to negatively influence a situation in the country.


Sylvie.


QUESTION: Do you have any detail on the controversy in the UN over the Hariri probe? Apparently, Russia wants to identify ten countries which didn't comply or didn't participate in the inquiry and the U.S. doesn't want to identify these countries. Why?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, you can talk to the Russians what their motivation is. But look, we -- you know, our position is that we defer to Mr. Brammertz as to whether or not he thinks it's useful to identify these countries. If he thinks it's useful, then we would support his decision to do so. If he decides that it is not in the interest of the investigation to make this information public, then we support his decision not to release those names.


The fundamental question here, and people shouldn't become distracted by it, is what does Mr. Brammertz think is most useful in allowing his investigation to move forward. We have and will continue to support him and the investigation in whatever ways we possibly can to see that those responsible for the murder of Prime Minister Hariri -- former Prime Minister Hariri -- are brought to justice.


QUESTION: But don't you think there is a risk this inquiry could be seen as partial because Syria has been criticized because they didn't comply enough to the inquiry and now we learn that ten countries didn't and nobody cares?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I'm not sure -- first of all, you also don't know all the details and you're taking one snapshot in time. So again, you know, it shouldn't be about finger-pointing at this time. The fact that Syria has been cited as not being fully cooperative in the past with the investigation was important because -- let's be frank -- the signs pointed to some Syrian involvement in some fashion. Those were some of the initial indications that came out of Mr. Brammertz's predecessor, Mr. Mehlis, in conducting the investigation.


So let's distinguish here between those who may or may not have played a role and their cooperation, played a role in the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri and their cooperation, and perhaps others who are not in any way thought to be complicit in the murder of former Prime Minister Hariri. So there are two different categories here, I think, and I think Syria quite clearly falls into a category of its own so I wouldn't try to lump them all together.


QUESTION: You don't think it could slow the probe in its --


MR. MCCORMACK: No, I think that at the end of the day when Mr. Brammertz has concluded his investigation that he will lay out for all the information that he has and people can look at the body of evidence that he has amassed and they can then look at the conduct of the tribunal that will be put in place to assess this evidence and then also hold to account those responsible for the murder of former Prime Minister Hariri. So there will be plenty of time to consider the evidence and people will be able to make their own judgments about it. But again, the most important thing here is the integrity of the investigation, and that means allowing Mr. Brammertz to do what he thinks is best in achieving the goals that he -- achieving the objective that he has been charged with by the Security Council.


Yeah.


QUESTION: The East Asia summit takes place this weekend in the Philippines. Is the United States unhappy about being excluded from this, and what do you hope the summit might produce in the way of support for the Doha WTO talks or various anti-terrorism measures?


MR. MCCORMACK: I don't think we have any particular consternation about being left out. There are plenty of regional groupings.


And as for the Doha round of trade talks, I don't know. I have to admit I'm not fully briefed up on what it is the East Asia summit might or might not produce, but we would hope that as a general concept that states take quite seriously the importance of trying to reach some accord in this round of talks. Free trade has greatly benefited nations around the world, and most especially those nations in East Asia who have seen their economies grow by leaps and bounds over the past several decades. That has been in large part because of free trade.


And it is very important that we continue our efforts as an international trading community to not only maintain that system of free trade but to expand it and to try to go after remaining impediments that exist to free trade. We are committed to that. We have made some important proposals. We have made some important concessions as part of this. Unfortunately, however, in a couple rounds of discussions that are part of the Doha -- overall Doha round. We have not succeeded as a free trading community in coming to full agreement, but we certainly have not -- we have not given up on efforts to try to come to a successful conclusion of the Doha round and we would call upon others, including those attending that East Asia summit, to do what they can to see that we succeed. It's important.


QUESTION: And on the anti-terrorism issue, which is another major theme of the conference?


MR. MCCORMACK: Again, I confess I don't know what it is that they're -- is exactly on their agenda, but clearly we hope that there is an attitude of working with -- among themselves as well as with us and other countries to fight terrorism around the world. It's certainly an appropriate topic given that this conference is being held in the Philippines, which has suffered from terrorism from the Abu Sayyaf group as well as others. And we all know about the other terrorist activities in Southeast Asia as well. So I think certainly given the location, geographic location, an appropriate topic for them to talk about.


QUESTION: We have a speech by the Secretary shortly. I don't know if there are others, but can we --


MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, I mean -- what, you want to throw me over for the Secretary, Charlie? Gosh almight. Let's go to Gollust here.


QUESTION: Richard Boucher -- is he on the road this week?


MR. MCCORMACK: Is he where?


QUESTION: Is he on the road this week?


MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, he is out of the building. I'm not sure exactly where. Beyond the borders of the United States.


QUESTION: We have reports that he was in Afghanistan and I just wonder, if he was, what he was up to.


MR. MCCORMACK: I don't know. We have to have a Boucher tracker. I don't know. He's on the road quite a bit. I can't tell you.


QUESTION: And just one more. Khaled Mashal, the militant leader of Hamas, has made seemingly some disarmingly conciliatory remarks about Israel today.


MR. MCCORMACK: You know, I've seen some snippets of those reports and I have to confess I haven't seen all the remarks and I have to -- I have to check with the experts who follow these things on a minute and daily basis for whether or not these are significant in any sort of positive way. I can't tell you if they are or not.


QUESTION: (Inaudible.)


MR. MCCORMACK: Well, you know, sometimes I'm tempted, George. (Laughter.)


Yeah.


QUESTION: Iraq Foreign Ministry yesterday said that he turned down a request by the government to delay the hanging of Saddam. I just wanted to know if you had any comment on that.


MR. MCCORMACK: You know, again, these are decisions for the Iraqis to make in terms of the timing. Our admonition has been to do this in a way that meets Iraqi laws and regulations.


QUESTION: Do you know if the Secretary has seen the cell phone video of Saddam's hanging at all?


MR. MCCORMACK: I don't know. It's been on TV pretty much non-stop for the past couple of weeks, so I'm sure that she probably caught some of it on the TV.


QUESTION: Do you think you can follow up on Iraq?


MR. MCCORMACK: Well (inaudible), yes, ma'am.


QUESTION: Latin America. Barbara Slovin recently in USA Today had an article --


MR. MCCORMACK: I think it's Slavin.


QUESTION: Slavin, is that correct? Yeah, I wasn't sure. Concern about leftist victories in Latin America has prompted President Bush to quietly grant a waiver that allows the U.S. to resume training militaries from eleven Latin American and Caribbean countries. The 2002 U.S. law bars countries from receiving military aid and training if they refuse to promote immunity from prosecution to U.S. service members who might get hauled before the International Criminal Court. The law allows presidential waivers. Do you know which countries have granted immunity so far?


MR. MCCORMACK: I don't. We'll try to get you an answer.


Lambros, last one. Make it short.


QUESTION: On Iraq, it's important. Mr. McCormack, it was reported by Nation magazine that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld met with Saddam Hussein during their last visit in Iraq and they asked him --


MR. MCCORMACK: When?


QUESTION: -- for his cooperation to defuse the resistance, but the late Iraqi dictator refused. I'm wondering is that true.


MR. MCCORMACK: That is just --


QUESTION: It was the last issue of the Nation magazine.


MR. MCCORMACK: That's just crazy. I don't know where they made that -- who made that up.


QUESTION: Even they underlined this in capital letters.


MR. MCCORMACK: It doesn't make it right. It just means they underlined it.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/78512.htm

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
January 11, 2007

Briefing by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 450
Dwight D. Eisenhower Executive Office Building



8:42 A.M. EST

SECRETARY RICE: Good morning. Today Secretary Gates and I will head to Capitol Hill to discuss with the Congress the new strategy for Iraq that President Bush outlined last night. All Americans know that the stakes in Iraq are enormous, and we all share the belief that the situation is currently unacceptable. On this we are united.

The President has outlined a strategy that relies on three main points. First, and most importantly, the Iraqis have devised their own strategy -- political, economic, and military -- and our efforts will support theirs. Among Americans and Iraqis, there is no confusion over one basic fact: It is the Iraqis who are responsible for what kind of country Iraq will be; it is they who must decide whether Iraq will be characterized by national unity or sectarian conflict. The President has conveyed to the Iraqi leadership that we will support their good decisions, but that Americans' patience is limited.

Second, we will further decentralize and diversify our civilian presence in Iraq to better assist the Iraqi people. Iraq has a federal government. We must therefore get our civilians out of the embassy, out of the Green Zone, and into the field across Iraq, to support promising local leaders and promising local structures. This will enhance and diversify our chances of success in Iraq.

The mechanism to accomplish this is the provincial reconstruction team, or PRT. The logic behind PRTs is simple: Success in Iraq relies on more than military efforts, it requires robust political and economic progress. Our military operations must be fully supported and integrated with our civilian and diplomatic efforts across the entire U.S. government to help Iraqis clear, hold and build throughout all Iraq.

We in the State Department fully understand our role in this mission and we are prepared to play it. We are already trying -- we are ready to strengthen, indeed, to surge our civilian efforts. We plan to expand our PRTs in Iraq from 10 to at least 18. In Baghdad we will go from one PRT to six, and in Anbar province, from one to three, because local leaders are taking encouraging steps there to confront violent extremists and to build hope for their people.

To oversee our economic support for the Iraqi people, and to ensure that it is closely integrated with our political assistance and our security strategy, I am pleased to announce today that I am appointing Ambassador Tim Carney to the new position of Coordinator for Iraq Transitional Assistance. Ambassador Carney is formerly our Ambassador to Haiti. He has enormous experience in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction and development. He will be based in Baghdad where he will coordinate and work closely with his Iraqi counterparts.

Finally, we are anchoring our efforts in Iraq within a regional diplomatic strategy, as the Iraq Study Group recommended. We are supporting the Iraqi government in crafting an international compact with the international community based on mutual obligations. And we are working with Turkey and Iraq on concerns about terrorism from the Kurdish Workers Party.

Iraq is central to the future of the Middle East. The security of this region is an enduring vital interest for the United States. And our continued leadership in this part of the world will contribute greatly to its stability and success.

Our regional diplomacy is based on the substantially changed realities in the Middle East. Historic change is unfolding in the region, unleashing old grievances, new anxieties, and some violence, but is also revealing a promising new strategic realignment in the Middle East. This is the same alignment that we see in Iraq. On one side are the many reformers and responsible leaders who seek to advance their interests peacefully, politically, and diplomatically. On the other side are extremists of every sect and ethnicity who use violence to spread chaos to undermine democratic governments and to impose agendas of hate and intolerance.

Our most urgent diplomatic goal is to empower reformers and responsible leaders across the region, and to confront extremists. The proper partners in our regional diplomacy are those who share these goals -- our allies, Israel and Turkey, of course, but democratic reformers and leaders in places like Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Iraq, and the responsible governments of the Gulf States, plus Egypt and Jordan, or the GCC plus two.

Tomorrow, I leave for the Middle East to continue consultations with our partners. Two governments have unfortunately chosen to align themselves with the forces of extremism -- both in Iraq and across the Middle East. One is Syria. Despite many appeals, including from Syria's fellow Arab states, the leaders in Damascus continue to support terrorism and to destabilize Iraq and their neighbors. The problem here is not a lack of engagement with Syria, but a lack of action by Syria.

Iran is the other. If the government in Tehran wants to help stabilize the region -- as it now claims -- then it should end its support for violent extremists who destroy the aspirations of innocent Lebanese, Palestinians and Iraqis. And it should end its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

I repeat an offer that I've made several times, today. If Iran suspends its uranium enrichment -- which is an international demand, not just an American one -- then the United States is prepared to reverse 27 years of policy. And I will meet with my Iranian counterpart any time, anywhere. Thus we would have the possibility to discuss every facet of our countries' relations. Until then, the international community must continue to hold the Iranian government accountable.

Syria and Iran should end their destabilizing behavior in the region. They cannot be paid to do so. That would only embolden our enemies and demoralize our friends, both in Iraq and across the region, all of whom are watching to see whether America has the will to keep its commitments. The United States will defend its interests and those of our friends and allies in this vital region.

And now I'm happy to turn the podium over to Secretary Gates, who will talk about the military aspect of the plan.

SECRETARY GATES: Thank you, Secretary Rice. This afternoon, General Pace and I will appear before the House Armed Services Committee to discuss the military aspects of the Iraq strategy announced by the President last night. Tomorrow we will appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The security plan is designed to have Iraqi forces lead a campaign, with our forces in support, to protect the population of Baghdad from intimidation and violence instigated by Sunni and Shia extremist groups, and to enable the Iraqi government to take the difficult steps necessary to address that nation's underlying issues. This means, above all, strengthening those in Iraq who are prepared to address its problems peacefully against those who seek only violence, death and chaos.

The term "surge" has been used in relation to increasing U.S. troop levels, and an increase certainly will take place. But what is really going on, and what is going to take place, is a surge across all lines of operations -- military and non-military, Iraqi and coalition. The President's plan has Iraqis in the lead and seeks a better balance of U.S. military and non-military efforts than was the case in the past. We cannot succeed in Iraq without the important non-military elements Secretary Rice just mentioned.

The increase in military forces will be phased in. It will not unfold overnight; there will be no D-Day; it won't look like the Gulf War. The timetable for the introduction of additional U.S. forces will provide ample opportunity early on and before many of the additional U.S. troops actually arrive in Iraq to evaluate the progress of this endeavor and whether the Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us.

This updated plan builds on the lessons and experiences of the past. It places new emphasis on and adds new resources to the holding and building part of the clear, hold, and build strategy. At this pivotal moment, the credibility of the United States is on the line in Iraq. Governments in the region, both friends and adversaries, are watching what we do and will draw their own conclusions about our resolve and the steadfastness of our commitments.

Whatever one's views on how we got to this point in Iraq, there is widespread agreement that failure there would be a calamity that would haunt our nation in the future, and in the region. The violence in Iraq, if unchecked, could spread outside its borders and draw other states into a regional conflagration. In addition, one would see an emboldened and strengthened Iran, a safe haven and base of operations for Jihadist networks in the heart of the Middle East, a humiliating defeat in the overall campaign against violent extremism worldwide, and an undermining of the credibility of the United States. Given what is at stake, failure in Iraq is not an option.

I would like to conclude my remarks with two announcements. First, the President announced last night that he would strengthen our military for the long war against terrorism by authorizing an increase in the overall strength of the Army and the Marine Corps. I am recommending to him a total increase in the two services of 92,000 soldiers and Marines over the next five years -- 65,000 soldiers, and 27,000 Marines. The emphasis will be on increasing combat capability.

This increase will be accomplished in two ways. First, we will propose to make permanent the temporary increase of 30,000 for the Army, and 5,000 for the Marine Corps. Then we propose to build up from that base in annual increments of 7,000 troops a year for the Army, and 5,000 for the Marine Corps, until the Marine Corps reaches a level of 202,000, and the Army would be at 547,000.

We should recognize that while it may take some time for these new troops to become available for deployment, it is important that our men and women in uniform know that additional manpower and resources are on the way.

Second, for several months, the Department of Defense has been assessing whether we have the right policies to govern how we manage and deploy members of the Reserves, the National Guard, and our active component units. Based on this assessment and the recommendations of our military leadership, I am making the following changes in Department policy.

First, the mobilization of ground Reserve forces going forward will be managed on a unit, instead of an individual basis. This change will allow us to achieve greater unit cohesion and predictability in how Reserve units train and deploy.

Second, from this moment forward, from this point forward, members of the Reserves who are -- will be involuntarily mobilized for a maximum of one year at a time, in contrast to the current practice of 16 to 24 months.

Third, the planning objective for Guard and Reserve units will remain one year of being mobilized, followed by five years demobilized. However, today's global demands will require a number of selected Guard and Reserve units to be remobilized sooner than this standard. Our intention is that such exceptions be temporary. The goal for the active force rotation cycle remains one year deployed for every two years at home station. Today, most active units are receiving only one year at home station before deploying again. Mobilizing select Guard and Reserve units before this five-year period is complete will allow us to move closer to relieving the stress on the total force.

Fourth, I'm directing the establishment of a new program to compensate individuals in both the active and Reserve components who are required to mobilize or deploy early, or extend beyond the established rotation policy goals.

Fifth, I am also directing that all commands and units review how they administer the hardship waiver program to ensure that they are properly taking into account exceptional circumstances facing military families of deployed service members.

It is important to note that these policy changes have been under discussion for some time within the Department of Defense and would be needed independently of the President's announcement on Iraq last night. And there will be a handout afterward on the details of these changes since they are a little complicated.

Finally, I'm pleased to report that all active branches of the United States military exceeded their recruiting goals for the month of December, with particularly strong showings by the Army and the Marine Corps. Our nation is truly blessed that so many talented and patriotic young people have stepped forward to defend our nation, and that so many servicemen and women have chosen to continue to serve.

Thank you, and we'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Secretary Gates, how long do you expect to maintain the surge in Iraq? And what happens if the Iraqis do not live up to their commitments?

SECRETARY GATES: Well, as I indicated, we're going to know pretty early on whether the Iraqis are meeting their military commitments, in terms of being able to go into all neighborhoods, in terms of the Iraqis being in the lead and carrying out the leadership and the fighting, and for there not to be political interference in the military operations that are going forward. As I say, this is going to unfold over a period of time, and so I think that as I indicated in my remarks, before very many American soldiers have been sent to Iraq, we'll have pretty good early indications of their performance. We'll have to see, in terms of the length of time. It's really hard to say at this point. It's viewed as a temporary surge. But I think no one has a really clear idea of how long that might be.

Q Can you define what success will be then, sir? If you don't know how long it will be -- I know one of the things over the last few months, the President was saying, we're winning in Iraq, we're winning in Iraq, suddenly he didn't think we were, so how do you define success? How do you know if it's not working? Certainly, there will be a period where it's bloodier, more violent. But at what point do you really know it's working?

SECRETARY GATES: Well, let me take a crack at it and then invite Condi to comment. I think that what we will see over time is a lessening of violence in Baghdad. If this strategy is successful, over time we will see a lessening of violence in Baghdad. We're going to be, to a certain extent, the prisoners of anyone who wants to strap on a bomb and blow themselves up. But if the environment in Baghdad improves to the point where the political process can go forward, where the reconciliation process can go forward, where an oil law can be passed for the distribution of the revenues from the oil sales, where provincial elections can go forward, and where the government is actually beginning to make its writ felt outside Baghdad and we see the government of Iraq beginning to operate more effectively -- I think all of these things -- as the President said last night and as I suggested this morning, it isn't going to be like anything we've experienced before in terms of when we'll know whether or not we're being successful. It's going to take a little time, and we will probably have a better view a couple of months from now in terms of whether we are making headway in terms of getting better control of Baghdad, with the Iraqis in the lead and with the Iraqis beginning to make better progress on the reconciliation process.

But let me ask Secretary Rice to offer her thoughts.

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I would underscore the point about political reconciliation. I do think the Iraqis obviously have to pass an oil law, they have to follow through on the promises that they've made to their own people about the inclusiveness of the political process.

I think as to -- I'd make one point about Baghdad and one point about the rest of the country. What has really happened in Baghdad -- and Prime Minister Maliki said this to the President -- is that the Iraqi people have lost confidence in the ability of their government to defend them in their capital, to protect them in their capital. And in fact, there are some, because of the sectarian overtones, who wonder if, in fact, their government is willing to protect them if they come from one sect or another.

And I think what the Iraqi government is trying to do and needs to do is to reestablish civil order, in the sense that they are, in fact, willing to, and capable of protecting all Iraqis who live in Baghdad. That means the kinds of activities that take place in these neighborhoods wouldn't be tolerated and they would, in fact, go after some of the violent people on either side who are causing the problems. And I think that will be a measure of how well they are doing.

In the provinces, it's also important to recognize that not everything -- as important as Baghdad is, not everything rests on Baghdad. One reason that we're diversifying and decentralizing into the provinces and the localities is that you want to strengthen the governance from the bottom up, as well. And we've learned that it is somewhat more effective to be able to deliver governance and economic development and reconstruction at a more local level.

And I think it's starting to have an effect. We've seen it work in Mosul, we've seen it work in Talafar, and as the Secretary said -- as Bob said, in Anbar, we're beginning to get some signs that the tribal sheiks there want to fight the violent extremists. And we've been in Anbar for awhile now working politically. So I think you should think of what the government needs to show in Baghdad, but also the building of governance structures outside of the country.

Q Secretary Rice, can I ask you a more fundamental question that applies to Secretary Gates, as well? If you look at the -- what's happened in Iraq, even recently -- I mean, the spectacle of the execution of Saddam Hussein, the trouble in the police ranks, and there's other examples -- why should the American people believe at this point that the Iraqis want reconciliation and a stable democratic government as much as the United States wants it for them?

And for Secretary Gates, I have a tactical question. Is the United States military and/or the Iraqi government prepared now to arrest or kill Muqtada al Sadr as part of this new increase?

SECRETARY RICE: David, on the first point, obviously this is a country that has had years and years of tragedy in which certain people were oppressed by other people. And it's perhaps not surprising that the passions and the anger runs pretty deep, and sometimes it expresses itself in ways that I think are not appropriate -- but it expresses itself. The Saddam trial was extremely unfortunate -- the Saddam hanging was extremely unfortunate. But, of course, we have to keep in mind, too, the victims and remember them first. But these passions do get expressed.

But as to whether the Iraqi people want to live in peace, I think that 12.5 million of them went out and voted against a lot of terrorist threats because they wanted a single Iraq. I think that you have to look at the way that their leaders are trying to work together. One of the things that's interesting about this national oil law, to which they are close, is that that's a very good sign of overcoming sectarian differences for a larger political purpose. And it's not as if they're not sacrificing for this unified Iraq. Tariq al Hashemi, who is the leading Sunni leader, has lost two brothers and a sister -- not actually to sectarianism, but to insurgents who do not want Sunnis to be a part of the process -- and, yet, he remains a part of the process.

So I think both at the level of the population and at the level of the political class, you have people who are intent on staying together in one Iraq, trying to overcome their differences with these fragile, new political institutions, and who are being buffeted and challenged in that by violent people on the extremes who are using sectarian purpose to kill innocent Iraqis. And what the Iraqi government has to do is to demonstrate firmly that it is fully committed to the protection of all Iraqis; it is fully committed to the punishment of any Iraqi who is engaged in killing innocents. And I think then you will begin to see more room for the kind of national reconciliation process that's been going on, but I think has, frankly, been undermined by the sectarian violence since February of '06.

SECRETARY GATES: I think a source of frustration for both Iraqi and American forces in the past has been political interference during clearing operations. And there are a number of instances that we've heard about of someone being detained and then a call being placed from some office in the government and, all of a sudden, that person is released because of political influence.

I think one of the most important commitments that the Prime Minister has made is that in this offensive, the military will have the authority to go after all law-breakers, there are no exceptions -- I'm not going to hang specific targets on specific people, but all law-breakers are susceptible to being detained or taken care of in this campaign.

Q But, sir, why be vague on the -- Sadr, because he has a long history here in this conflict as being on a most wanted list of the United States. Then the Iraqis persuaded the U.S. not to arrest him. He leads the Mahdi Army. I mean, this is the bad guy that the United States makes clear is helping to bring down this government. So why not commit to what our posture is with regard to him now?

SECRETARY GATES: What I will say is that all parts of Baghdad are going to be involved in this campaign, including Sadr City.

Q Could I ask the Chairman a question?

SECRETARY GATES: Please, let the Chairman --

Q We have heard repeatedly over the past year, and President Bush was fairly explicit about it last night, that Iran has been supplying ordinance that has been killing American troops. If this is so, why are we not matching Iranian force with force of our own? And why are we content to continue issuing statements of displeasure -- what do we think that's going to accomplish? And have you made any recommendations along these lines?

GENERAL PACE: What we've been doing, and will continue to do, is to track the networks of individuals, regardless of their nationality, inside of Iraq that are providing weapons that are designed to kill our troops. I think it's instructive that in the last couple of weeks two of those raids that we conduct to go after these folks that are providing these kinds of weapons -- two of those raids had policed up Iranians. So it is clear that the Iranians are complicit in providing weapons, and it's also clear that we will do all we need to do to defend our troops in Iraq by going after the entire network, regardless of where those people come from.

Q Are you going after them in Iran? Why not go to the source?

GENERAL PACE: We can take care of the security for our troops by doing the business we need to do inside of Iraq. And there are other methods, especially the kind that Secretary Rice has outlined, to deal with government-to-government relationships with Iran. But with regard to those who are physically present trying to do harm to our troops, regardless of nationality, we will go after them and defend ourselves.

Q One last attempt at this, let me take one last, different way. Has anyone in the military recommended operations inside Iran?

GENERAL PACE: No.

Q General Pace, can I just ask you a question, as long as he is at the podium?

Q Secretary Rice --

SECRETARY RICE: Why don't you go ahead while he's still at the podium, and I'll referee. (Laughter.)

Q Okay. General Pace, can you talk about the numbers? The President, Secretary Gates, everyone has said this is the most important operation; you have to succeed in there. So why just 20,000 troops? The studies from RAND show a much greater number would probably be needed. Why just 20,000, and is it because we don't really have more troops to go in there? And were there recommendations for much larger numbers of troops within the Joint Staff?

GENERAL PACE: First of all, this is not a re-invasion of Iraq, this is looking at the problem areas, specifically Baghdad and al Anbar, to determine what we can do to help the Iraqi government to protect their own people. In doing the military analysis of that -- let's take Baghdad, for example -- we looked at the Iraqi plan, which is a commander, two division commanders, nine districts, each of which would have an Iraqi brigade at its lead, and then our ability to reinforce each of those brigades with a battalion of our own, and also provide additional advisors inside those battalions.

When you then take a look at the activities that they must conduct -- the patrolling, the checkpoints, the quick reaction forces, the going door-to-door to see the people and let them know that there is a security presence, when you look at those kinds of activities, and you do what we call a "troop-to-task analysis," you end up needing more forces in Baghdad than are currently there -- preferably Iraqi forces, and the Iraqis are going to provide additional forces -- but when you look at capacity, there are still unique capabilities that the U.S. Armed Forces have that are useful to assisting the Iraqi government. And that's how our commanders on the ground did the analysis, and that's why General Casey and his commanders came forward and asked for additional forces. They asked for additional forces for Baghdad, and they asked for additional forces for al Anbar.

In fact, we have put into the pipeline to go more forces than their analysis on the ground indicated they would need initially to ensure that as the enemy makes decisions and decides what they're going to do, that we have the capacity available to our commanders on the ground to get the job done.

Q -- the fact that we're so stretched.

GENERAL PACE: Being stretched is part of the equation, but it does not impact the recommendation about how many troops are needed. We have sufficient capacity inside the U.S. Armed Forces to be able to do this plus-up. But we should not -- we must be mindful of the fact that our active forces have been rotating in and out at about one year in, one year out. And our Guard and Reserve forces have been going in at about one year and coming out for about five. The total force mix of the United States the Secretary talked about is available to solve this problem in Iraq and also to handle any other problems. So it very much is on our mind as far as how we resource this plus-up. But it had nothing to do with the division -- with the decision of the commanders on the ground as far as how many troops are needed.

They tell us here in Washington how many they need, and once that is accepted as the requirement, then we have the responsibility to find the proper mix of forces to go do that. And that's what General Schoomaker in the Army and that's what General Conway in the Marine Corps will be doing.

Q To be clear, if it appears that the Iraqis are not meeting the commitments they have made, will we withhold sending these troops on this phased-in process?

SECRETARY GATES: I think that if we get some indication that the Iraqis are not fulfilling their commitments, the way this is going to unfold, we are going to have a number of opportunities to go back to the Iraqis and point out where they have failed to meet their commitments, and to move forward. I think that, frankly, based on the President's conversations and the conversations that our Ambassador and General Casey have had, not just with the Prime Minister but with President Talabani and with other leaders in the Iraqi government, that there is a broad commitment in the Iraqi government across several different groups in the government to make this work. So I think our assumption going forward is that they have every intention of making this work, of fulfilling their commitments.

And, frankly, the notion that the Iraqis are standing by while we're doing the fighting is really not an accurate statement. In fact, one of our military folks told me the other day that now more than half of the casualties coming into U.S. military hospitals in Iraq are Iraqi military, so they are fighting. And as we saw in the streets of Baghdad just in the last couple of days, they are fighting. So I think that our belief is they will fulfill these commitments. But if we see them falling short, we will make sure that they know that and how strongly we feel about it.

Q Secretary Rice, there's been a great deal of emphasis on Maliki's government performing and whether or not there's too much pressure being put on him. If you would, in all fairness, respond to a Reuters wire that's just crossed, comments that Reuters reports that was made in an open microphone between television interviews this morning, it quotes you saying, "I don't want to descend on the Maliki government and look like just sort of beat their brains out. The President was pretty tough last night, and we'll be pretty tough today. Give them a little time now to do something, a little breathing space."

Are these accurate comments from Reuters? And is there a sense or a risk of being too hard on Maliki?

SECRETARY RICE: I don't think there is a sense of not being very tough about the commitments and the obligations that we expect. And, yes, it's an accurate quote. It was an open mike, but it was an accurate quote.

And the point was, I was asked, are you going to go to Baghdad right away. And I said that I thought it was important to have the Maliki government have a little time now to make its plan work. After all, this is the Maliki government's plan. They came to the President with this plan in Amman. They said, we need to put together a plan that will help us to deal with the problem that our population doesn't believe that we can secure them. I believe that Bob's point about "they're sitting on the sidelines" is just not the right view.

However, they haven't performed in the past, and so the President is absolutely right -- and we have all been saying to them, you have to perform. I do think now Prime Minister Maliki needs to work with his government, get his Baghdad commander in place, get his forces in place, get his reconstruction coordinator appointed, and then I fully expect at that time, probably in not very long, to go to Baghdad and to work with them. But I do think it's important to give them a little time to get organized.

Q And when you say "breathing space" or, "a little time," do you have a certain sense of the timetable? Is that months?

SECRETARY RICE: No. They have to get organized right away, and they are. He announced a Baghdad commander. They're going to put this in place. I think their forces start to flow in on February 1st, so this is coming in very quick order. But again, the question was, are you going to go immediately to Baghdad, and my point was that I think we've made very clear what the expectations are of the Maliki government, very clear both in public and in private what those expectations are. And now I expect the Maliki government is going to organize itself to carry out those obligations.

Q Can I turn back to Iran for just a second and get a little bit back into what James was talking about? The President's language last night was rather muscular, when he talked about seek and destroy these networks. Does that extend beyond the kinds of operations that General Pace -- if you both could answer this, actually -- beyond the kinds of operations that General Pace was talking about? Was the raid this morning, for instance, part of that? Will we see more of that in the coming days? Can you explain a little bit more about what he meant when he used that language last night?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think General Pace has spoken to what we think the necessity is and what it is we intend to do. We've made very clear to the Iranian government, and the Syrian government, for that matter, that we don't expect them to continue to engage in behavior that is destabilizing to the Iraqi government, but also that endangers our troops, and that we will do what is necessary for force protection. But we leave to those who deal with issues of force protection how these raids are going to be taken out.

I think you got an indication of that in what has been happening, which is the networks are identified, they are identified through good intelligence. They are then acted upon. It is without regard to whoever is in them, whatever the nationality. And we're going to protect our troops.

Now, as to state-to-state relations or the lack thereof in 27 years, that's a different matter. And we've been very clear with the Iranians that -- through others and publicly -- that they need to stop pursuing a nuclear weapon -- we have a policy on that -- that we have a Chapter Seven resolution, and that we believe that puts Iran in a very unfavorable category of states. And therefore, that people ought to be careful in how they deal with financial relations with the Iranians. And you'll continue to see those efforts, too. But I think General Pace has spoken to what we think we need to do in Iraq.

Q Secretary Rice, could I ask you about the future shape and role of the international coalition in Iraq? And also, the idea of a regional conference for Iraq?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, as to the future shape and coalition, there continue to be coalition forces operating in Iraq. The South Koreans, the Japanese, others, have re-upped their forces again to continue operating in Iraq. And there is a NATO training mission for officers in Iraq. And so I think you'll continue to see that kind of international support.

Now, the international compact for Iraq is a framework in which there can be real support for Iraq that is, in fact, a kind of conditional support the Iraqis undertake to do certain obligations. We undertake, as an international community, to match those obligations with resources. Many of the states that, for instance, the Iraqis owed debt to have agreed to very favorable terms -- 80 percent of debt reduction. We've agreed to 100 percent of debt reduction. And I think you'll see more of that.

Now, I'm going to the Middle East with the GCC because I feel very strongly that those states that are part of an alignment that understands that there are extremist forces that need to be resisted need to be mobilized and rallied in support of this Iraqi government. The states, like Saudi Arabia and Jordan and others, have been helping with Sunni outreach. I hope that they will help with more. But I think the international compact is the right framework for now because it is an international effort that is actually led by the Iraqis and the United Nations, which is really the proper way for Iraq to engage its neighbors.

Q -- for anyone. Is there anything you could do for protection of foreign workers in Iraq, including Russians? Russians have a fair number of workers there.

GENERAL PACE: I think each country that has civilians there is responsible to provide security for their own folks. So if the Russian have folks there that they want to have doing certain activities, I'm sure that they've taken to account the kind of security they need to provide for them.

Q Secretary Gates, can you explain the practical effect of the mobilization changes you announced today? Does it wipe the slate clean for Guard members who have already gone to Iraq? And do you anticipate having to mobilize units that have already done tours there again?

SECRETARY GATES: Let me ask General Pace to answer that question.

GENERAL PACE: There will be remobilization of forces, and that remobilization has been contemplated before the announcement of these additional forces, because we have a rotation base of active forces that we try to maintain, one year overseas, two years home. And that rotation has gone to one year overseas, one year home.

On the Guard and Reserve side, we try to get one year mobilized and five years demobilized. It's really been more like a year-and-a-half to almost two years mobilized, and then -- so the Secretary's comments not only allow us to remobilize forces that we need to assist in the total force effort that we've got going on in Iraq, but als